Politics, the Deficit and Tax Reform by Wolfe, David A.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 26, Number 2 (Summer 1988) Article 5
Politics, the Deficit and Tax Reform
David A. Wolfe
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Wolfe, David A.. "Politics, the Deficit and Tax Reform." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 26.2 (1988) : 347-366.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol26/iss2/5
POLITICS, THE DEFICIT AND TAX
REFORM*
By DAVID A. WOLFE**
Issues of tax policy evoke widely varying reactions from tax
practitioners, economists and students of the policy process. What
differentiates the approach of the policy analyst from those of the
other two is a concern with the role of tax policy and tax reform
within the broader array of public policies. The policy analyst can
study taxes from a number of perspectives: as one of an array of
policy instruments available to governments to achieve desired policy
ends; or, as part of the revenue budgetary process, the means by
which government raises the funds to be allocated through the
expenditure budgetary process; or finally, as one of the means used
by government to affect the over-all distribution of income in society.
Each of these perspectives emphasizes the role played by taxation in
linking the institutions of the state to the broader social and
economic context within which it is embedded. The pattern of
taxation through which state revenues are generated reveals
fundamental truths about the prevailing pattern of relations between
the state and society.
One of the hallmarks of the advanced industrial society of
the post-war period has been the relative increase in the reliance on
the income tax as the primary source of public revenues and the
decline in importance of more traditional forms of taxation, such as
commodity taxes. In this respect, the increased prominence of the
income tax was linked to other changes associated with the rise of
the Keynesian welfare state. Changes in the corporate income tax,
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in particular, assumed an increasingly prominent role among the
policy instruments employed by the state to promote economic
growth and development. The preference for the corporate income
tax as an instrument of economic policy was closely tied to the
diffusion of Keynesian ideas within government policy-making circles.
The widespread acceptance of Keynesianism was itself a key aspect
of the post-war political settlement between labour and capital in
most of the industrial democracies. The terms of the post-war
settlement involved a trade-off: control of the investment decision-
making process was left in the hands of private enterprise in
exchange for the use of macroeconomic policies to stabilize levels of
employment and income, the generation of rising levels of mass
consumption, and the expansion of the public sector to guarantee a
minimum level of social welfare for all members of society. The
political rationale provided by Keynesian economic theory legitimated
the terms of the settlement:
It was Keynesianism that provided the ideological and political foundations for the
compromise of capitalist democracy. Keynesianism held out the prospect that the
state could reconcile the private ownership of the means of production with
democratic management of the economy.... Democratic control over the level of
unemployment and the distribution of income became the terms of the compromise
which made democratic capitalism possible.1
The success of the post-war settlement depended upon the
ability of the state to maintain a steady rate of economic growth
with stable levels of prices and employment. Given the underlying
assumptions of the Keynesian compromise, the achievement of this
result was, in turn, dependent upon the investment behaviour of
private firms. In this context, corporate tax policy constituted an
important part of the post-war settlement. The high level of public
spending occasioned by the increased provision of welfare benefits
required governments to tap a wide variety of revenue sources. For
both political and economic reasons, the corporate income tax
represented an essential component of this expanded revenue base.
At the same time, governments had to ensure that the taxation of
private profits through the corporate income tax did not undermine
the prospect of sustained investment. This would have jeopardized
I A. Przeworski & M. Wallerstein, 'Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads" (1982) 2
Democracy 52 at 54.
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the over-all rates of growth in the economy, and ultimately, the
terms of the political settlement itself. As a consequence, the
selected application of corporate tax measures came to be used as
a critical means for ensuring that the incentives to invest remained
strong, while leaving the nominal rates of corporate taxation
untouched. Thus, the politics of the corporate income tax played a
central role in the way that the specific terms of the post-war
settlement were elaborated in most of the industrial democracies.
The broad consensus which existed about both the use of
Keynesian fiscal policies and the role of the income tax in revenue
generation began to dissolve in the 1970s with the emergence of
simultaneous inflation and unemployment. The inability of
Keynesian policies to deal with these problems was compounded by
their growing association with the burgeoning deficits that
characterized the public finances of many industrial countries. The
re-emergence of budgetary deficits as a major political issue in the
1970s, in turn, heightened the political debate surrounding the main
components of the public finances - the revenue and expenditure
budgets. Although both sides of the budgetary process have been
subjected to increasing public scrutiny in the past decade, the exact
relation between them and the emerging deficits has been poorly
understood, at best. Similarly, the specific national contexts of
budgetary deficits have been sparsely analyzed. Although many
Western industrial nations have incurred higher budgetary deficits,
there are wide variations in the extent and source of these deficits.
Some of the variance is undoubtedly accounted for by the different
patterns of economic growth experienced in these countries, but
political factors have also played a critical role.
Recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in the
comparative politics literature analyzing the relationship between
economic and political variables, including a number of studies that
have focused directly on the relationship between the emergence of
budgetary deficits and a set of political and economic variables. The
results of these studies indicate that the tendency for governments
to incur deficits, and the way in which governments react to the
incidence of deficits, is closely linked to the nature of partisan
politics within the individual countries. The extent of control of
government by leftist or rightist parties accounts for a substantial
degree of the cross-national variations that are observed. This
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variable in turn is strongly affected by the underlying relationship
between the organization of social interests and politics parties.
The findings of a study by Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev,
concerning the political and social variables that affect the incidence
of industrial unrest, contain useful insights for this question. The
authors note a strong relationship between the extent of continuous
control of government by leftist parties and the degree of harmony
in industrial relations. The incidence of industrial strife is directly
affected by the level and nature of government spending
programmes, themselves the products of the partisan control of
government. The presence of leftist parties in government is in turn
closely tied to a number of social factors, including the degree of
unionization of the labour force, the degree of working class
mobilization, the predominance of industrial unions within the labour
movement, the degree of unity within the labour movement, and the
strength of the ties between the labour movement and leftist political
parties.2
Building on these findings, David Cameron examined the
experience of the industrial nations to consider the effects of
partisan control of the government on the origins of the deficit in
the last two decades. His findings indicate a very high correlation
between partisan control of the government and the level and rate
of increase of government expenditure. Control of the government
by leftist parties has had a substantial effect on both the level and
the composition of government spending. Those countries having
the highest incidence and most extended duration of leftist
governments experienced the greatest increase in spending on social
programmes. To some extent, government attempts to compensate
for declining rates of economic growth after the mid-1960s accounted
for the growth of social spending. However, even after this variable
was taken into account, the partisanship of governments still
2 W. Korpi & M. Shalev, "Strikes, Power and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976'
in M. Zeitlin, ed., Political Power and Social Theoy (New York: JAI Press, 1980) 301 at 316.
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explained a substantial proportion of the difference in levels of social
spending.3
On analyzing the relationship between these factors and the
incidence of deficits among the industrial countries, Cameron found
that most governments were in a deficit position for the period after
1965. Furthermore, the size of the deficit increased in the period
up to the early 1980s. Contrary to most popular expectations, he
found no necessary correlation between high levels of public
expenditure and the size of the deficits incurred by various
governments. The more significant variable in predicting the size of
the deficit was the relative taxing capacity of the various
governments. In fact, there are significant differences in the
revenue-generating capacity of the major OECD4 nations. Statistical
analysis of the source of these variations indicated that they were
produced by the partisan complexion of governments in the
individual countries. Countries that experienced stable and enduring
leftist government in the period after 1965 had higher levels of
taxation than countries in which conservative governments prevailed.
The variation in the average size of the budgetary deficits was
closely related to the variations in taxing capacity; there was an
inverse relationship between the level of taxation and the size of the
deficit.s On the basis of these findings, Cameron concluded that
[e]vidently, enduring control of government by leftist parties allows nations to enjoy
the benefits of a large and expanding public economy - for example, relatively
generous provision of social security benefits, social assistance, and unemployment
compensation - while avoiding whatever macroeconomic costs are produced by large
deficits. How? By imposing relatively high taxes - especially taxes on personal
income and health. The nations in which nonleftist parties usually govern are more
likely to experience a smaller, more miserly public economy (especially when
conservatives dominate government and a chronic fiscal crisis reflected in relatively
large deficits (especially when centrist and Christian Democratic parties dominate
3 D.R. Cameron, 'Taxes, Spending and Deficits: Does Government Cause Inflation?" in
L. Lindberg & C. Maier, eds, The Politics of Inflation and Recession, (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1985) 224 at 234-39.
4Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
5Cameron, supra, note 3 at 252-59.
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government), for they are more reluctant to levy high taxes, especially the taxes on
income and wealth which fall most heavily on their upper-income supporters.
6
Cameron's findings concerning the political determinants of
the tax structure receive substantial confirmation from the results of
another study, by Manfred Schmidt. Schmidt examined the factors
that contributed to variations in the taxing capacity of the Western
industrial democracies from 1950 to the mid-1970s, breaking the
findings down into three different periods for the post-war era. In
the first period, the 1950s, the growth of taxing capacity was
influenced by three factors: the degree of external dependence of
the economy (as individual economies became more integrated into
the world economy in the early post-war years, a greater degree of
state intervention was required to control the repercussions of that
enhanced integration);7 the over-all rate of economic growth, which
provided a broader base from which to extract government revenues;
and left-wing control of the major offices of the state.8
The second period, 1960 to 1975, witnessed the most
considerable expansion of the taxing capacity of government in these
nations. In this period, the political composition of governments and
the relative openness of the economy continued to be significant
factors, but they were supplemented by another set of intervening
variables. Of major importance were the degree of cohesion among
rightist political parties, and the relative strength of the organized
labour movement. In countries in which there were organizational
and ideological splits among the parties of the right, fewer political
impediments obstructed the expansion of the tax system to finance
a higher level of public expenditures on health, welfare and
educational programmes.
9
6Ibid at 260.
7This finding is congruent with the major finding of an earlier study. Compare D.R.
Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy' (1978) 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1243.
8 M.G. Schmidt, 'The Role of the Parties in Shaping Macroeconomic Policy" in F.G.
Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Parties and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London
and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982) 97 at 118.
9Ibid at 120.
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In the most recent period of his study, covering the economic
recession from the mid-1970s onward, the findings were clouded by
the impact of lower rates of economic growth on government
revenues. When this cyclical effect was controlled, the findings were
very similar to those for the two earlier periods. The growth of the
tax state continued to be much higher under social democratic
governments, or in situations in which there was an even distribution
of power between the leftist and rightist parties. In countries
dominated by political parties of the right, increases in tax revenues
were distinctly lower than would be expected on the basis of rates
of economic growth.10
In sharp contrast to the ideological stance of most right-wing
parties, the countries that have run the largest deficits are those in
which centrist or right-wing parties have predominated for most of
the post-war period. Because of the political constraints imposed
upon them by their own electoral constituencies, these governments
have proven less able than left-wing ones to implement the tax
policies necessary to finance existing levels of public expenditure.
This general finding is quite consistent with the statistical evidence
available on the source of budgetary deficits in Canada from the
mid-1970s onwards." Although a large part of the Canadian deficit
was caused by cyclical economic factors, most of the remainder
resulted from the failure of governments to balance their revenue
raising capacity with the growth of public expenditures. Canada
certainly fits the case suggested by Cameron, in that the federal
government has been dominated by a centrist government for most
of the post-war period. A closer examination of the politics of
taxation in the post-war Keynesian era suggests that the experience
of the federal government in Canada closely parallels those of other
centrist and right-wing governments.
lOIbid at 123.
III have analyzed the statistical evidence on the source of budgetary deficits in Canada
in greater detail in 'The Politics of the Deficit" in G.B. Doern, ed., The Politics of Economic
Policy, vol. 40 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 111 at 112 [Background studies
prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for
Canada].
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In Canada, it was the Liberal government of Prime Minister
Mackenzie King that engineered the terms of the post-war political
settlement and introduced Keynesian policy ideas into government
use. The key to the success of the Liberal party in the post-war
period was its ability to balance the competing claims of the broad
political constituencies from which it drew support. A wide array of
legislation passed in 1944 and 1945 as part of its reconstruction
programme was essential to the early post-war success of the Liberal
government. 2 Part of this programme was the introduction in the
corporate income tax of a measure to allow for the double
depreciation on up to 80 percent of the cost of investments in
productive plant or equipment for the reconversion, modernization
or expansion of facilities following the end of the war. Other
measures introduced by the government allowed companies to write
off current expenditures for research and development, to average
their profit basis over several years for taxation purposes and to
write off portions of the Excess Profits Tax for use in capital
expansion.13  These measures were intended to facilitate the
reconversion of the economy from a wartime basis to peacetime
production, as well as to overcome business fears about the
possibility of a post-war recession.
In addition, the government viewed the corporate tax
measures as important because of the perceived need for a trade-
off with the extensive new social welfare measures also introduced
as part of its reconstructive programme. Both were integral
components of the post-war settlement between capital and labour.
The key to the success of the settlement (and the electoral fortunes
of the Liberal party) was the perception by both sides that this new
form of state intervention would ultimately work to their advantage.
12D.A Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy,
1930-1982' in M.S. Cross & G.S. Kealey, eds, Readings in Canadian Social History, vol. 5:
Modern Canada, 1930-1980s (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1984) 46 at 49.
1 3 Canada, Department of Reconstruction and Supply, Encouragement to Industrial
Expansion in Canada: Operation of Special Depreciation Provisions, November 10, 1944 -
March 31, 1949 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948) at 17, 22.
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The dramatic rise in popularity of the CCF1 4 and the increased
militancy of organized labour during the war had made Mackenzie
King and the Liberals keenly aware of the need for reform to
counter the political challenge from the left. However, the party's
political history made them acutely conscious of the dangers of
alienating the major business interests in Canadian society. The
recollection of the "free trade" follies of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries made Mackenzie King determined not to
repeat the mistakes of the past. The Liberal government's able
prosecution of the war effort had gained them substantial support
among Canada's business leaders. This support went a long way
towards overcoming any opposition that might have been voiced to
the reform measures. The corporate tax incentives provided the
additional bond to secure the terms of the settlement. As Reg
Whitaker has argued, the key to the Liberals' post-war electoral
hegemony was the ability to balance this competing set of business
and reform concerns:
The Liberal party was operating in an environment in which two sometimes
contradictory forces were at work in shaping the party's role. On the one hand, the
party had to finance its operations as a party as well as manage a capitalist economy
as a government, both of which left it vulnerable to the demands of the corporate
capitalist world. On the other hand, the party had to get votes, which left it
vulnerable to the demands of public opinion.... The Liberal party demonstrated
superior skill at calling in one of these forces to redress the balance when the other
became too dominating.
1 5
The limits of this strategy seemed to have been reached,
however, with the disastrous defeats of the party at the hands of
John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives in the federal elections
of 1957 and 1958. The defeats set in motion a critical process of
reappraisal within the Liberal party, particularly among a younger
generation of party activists. Their feeling was that the party had
lost track of the appropriate balance and its policy orientation had
shifted too far to the right during the last years of the St. Laurent
government. A recovery of the reforming spirit that had guided the
1 4 Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-33 to 1958; democratic socialist
movement and political party, forerunner of New Democratic Party.
1 5 R. Whitaker, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of
Canada, 1930-1958 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) at 401-402.
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Liberals through the early post-war years was required to improve
the party's electoral prospects. The call for a renewed spirit of
reform was captured best in several of the papers presented to the
study conference sponsored by the National Liberal Federation at
Queen's University, Kingston in September, 1960 - particularly those
by Tom Kent and Maurice Lamontagne.
The paper by Tom Kent outlined the social reforms needed
to recapture the spirit that had guided the Liberal policy in the
reconstruction era. They included the introduction of medical
insurance to complement the programme of hospital insurance
created in 1957; an improved unemployment benefits scheme, which
would be sensitive to national variations in the rate of
unemployment; improved retraining programmes for the unemployed;
the introduction of measures to simulate the relocation of capital to
the depressed regions of the country; urban renewal programmes;
better support for the educational system; improved programmes to
deal with hard-core welfare cases; and improved levels of foreign
aid. 6 Owing to Kent's role as senior policy advisor to Lester
Pearson, and with strong support from the progressive wing of the
Liberal party, Kent's proposals virtually became the policy agenda of
the Liberal governments of the 1960s. This marked shift to the left
in party policy under Pearson angered Liberal supporters in the
business community who felt that the traditional liberalism of King
and St. Laurent was being abandoned. 7
The emphasis on redistributive policies seemed to be even
more accentuated during the early years of the Trudeau government,
to the continued dismay of business interests. This growing
dissatisfaction with the Liberals crystallized in opposition to the
effort at comprehensive tax reform, which followed closely after a
decade of major social reforms. Irony lay in the fact that the tax
reform process had been initiated by the Diefenbaker government
when, in response to business' concerns over problems with the tax
system, it established the Royal (Carter) Commission in September
1 6 T. Kent, Social Policy for Canada: Towards a Philosophy of Social Security (Ottawa:
Policy Press, 1962) at 39-50.
17C. McCall-Newman, Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1982) at 268.
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1962 to study the matter and make recommendations. The final
report of the Royal Commission, released in 1967, was far from what
had been expected. It adopted a position which stressed the need
for the integration of personal and corporate taxation and placed
primary emphasis on the personal income tax as the best means to
achieve this goal. The Commission recommended that horizontal
equity was to be achieved through broadening the base of the
personal income tax to include virtually all accretions to wealth;
personal and corporate income taxes were to be fully integrated; the
corporate income tax would continue to be collected at a uniform
rate for all corporate profits, but would be only a withholding tax to
be credited against the personal tax due on income; the preferential
tax treatment afforded to earnings from mineral extraction was to be
substantially reduced; and finally, insurance companies and banks
were to be taxed in a manner more nearly conforming with other
companies. The recommendations of the Royal Commission were
met by an extremely hostile reaction from the business community,
despite the impeccable, blue-ribbon credentials of its members. As
one student of the subject expressed it, "The release of the Carter
Report unleashed one of the most massive campaigns of corporate
pressure upon the state in modern Canadian political history."18
In an effort to mollify the outraged business community,
some of the Carter recommendations were substantially watered
down in the White Paper on Tax Refonn introduced by the Trudeau
government in 1969. With respect to the corporate income tax, the
White Paper proposed that corporations be classified into two types,
widely-held and closely-held, to be determined by the method of
trading of the corporation's shares. The tax treatment of the closely-
held corporations was to follow the full-integration model
recommended by the Carter Commission, while the widely-held
corporations were only to be subject to half integration. The White
Paper also recommended that realized capital gains be brought into
income and taxed at ordinary rates. The corporation income tax was
to be levied at a uniform rate of 50 percent on all corporate income,
effectively eliminating the preferred tax treatment of small
1 8 R. Gardner, 'Tax Reform and Class Interests: The Fate of Progressive Reform,
1967-72," (1981) 3 Can. Tax. 245 at 247.
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businesses. The mining and oil industries were to continue to
receive preferential treatment but to a slightly lesser extent than they
had previously.
The White Paper proposals were referred to standing
committees of the House of Commons and the Senate for detailed
study and public comment. The standing committees, particularly the
Senate committee, which was largely composed of corporate tax
lawyers, provided a convenient platform for the numerous business
opponents of the proposed reforms to air their positions.
Opposition to the White Paper was expressed through organized,
mass letter-writing campaigns, through intensive lobbying efforts
organized by the major business interests, and through strategic
announcements of delays in major investment projects. The proposal
to eliminate the lower tax rate for small businesses stimulated a
strong reaction. Opposition from small business rallied behind the
hastily formed Canadian Council for Fair Taxation in an extensive
lobbying and public relations effort. The mining companies, led by
Alfred Powis of Noranda Mines, were especially skilled at lobbying
the provincial governments to make representations on their behalf
to the federal government. The public debate over the tax reform
proposals occurred in the middle of 1970, when many businesses in
Canada were already beginning to suffer the adverse effects of the
recession induced by the government's restraint policies. The newly
elected Liberal Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, who had
promised to create 100,000 new jobs in the province, was especially
vulnerable to the threatened capital strike. Inevitably, the Liberal
government caved in under this sustained pressure from the business
community. The reports of both Parliamentary committees
recommended substantial modifications to the proposals of the White
Paper and even before the reports were tabled in late 1970, the
government had committed itself to some key changes.
1 9
191biL at 251-53; the stages of tax reform are also described in M. Bucovetsky & R.M.
Bird, 'Tax Reform in Canada: A Progress Report" (1972) 25 Nat'l Tax 3. 15; first-hand
accounts of the policy process are provided by E. Kierans, "Problems of Tax Reform" (Winter
1979) 1 Can. Tax 22; M. Saltsman, 'Reflections on Tax Reform in Canada" (Winter 1979) 1
Can. Tax. 25 at 25-26. The specific role played by the mining industry is analyzed in M.
Bucovetsky, "The Mining Industry and the Great Tax Reform Debate" in A.P. Pross, ed.,
Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975) 89.
The influential role of the Senate Committee on Banking and Finance is discussed in C.
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The amendments to the Income Tax Act that were finally
introduced in 1971 contained an even more diluted version of the
proposals originally recommended by the Carter Commission. In the
area of capital gains, only half of the realized gains were to be
reported as personal income and taxed at the applicable rate; in the
place of the integration of personal and corporate income tax, there
was to be a partial gross-up and credit for dividends received from
taxable Canadian corporations; the corporate tax rate was set at a
lower level than had originally been proposed and the lower tax rate
on the profits of small businesses was retained; and finally, the
provisions relating to the taxation of income from mining and oil and
gas production followed the broad outlines of the White Paper, but
incorporated several further liberalizations with respect to the assets
of new mines and the calculations of earned depletion allowances.20
In effect the final result of the nearly nine-year-long tax
reform process was a far cry from the scope and breadth of the
original set of Carter proposals. By any objective criterion, the
outcome of the political process would have to be seen as a great
victory for the various business groups that had lobbied long and
hard to protect their vested interests. The political costs of their
acceptance of even a limited broadening of the tax base was the
inclusion of a number of principal concessions: the one-half taxation
of capital gains; the introduction of the dividend tax credit; the
retention of the small-business tax rate; and the allowance of
deductions for interest on money borrowed to acquire the shares of
another corporation (which was included at the last minute in the
tax reform bill). Reflecting on the outcome from the perspective of
a decade later, J. Harvey Perry, a former member of the Carter
Commission, wrote:
It is an understatement to say that the final results fell far short of [the] goals. The
grand designs crumbled under concerted taxpayer pressure.... The federal tax system
Campbell, The Canadian Senate: A Lobby From Within (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada,
1978) at 15-17.
2 0 Gardner, supra, note 18 at 253-55; Bucovetsky & Bird, supra, note 19 at 15-41.
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is now so riddled with special features that one would almost conclude that the
reverse of the commission's plea for neutrality had been followed.... 21
In spite of the clear victory that they had won, the entire reform
process left a bitter taste in the mouths of the business community,
and a legacy of bad feeling between it and the Liberal government
of Pierre Trudeau.
The moderate degree of uniformity and progressivity achieved
as a result of tax reform was further eroded in the budgets of the
subsequent years. The erosion began with the first budget of the
new Finance Minister, John Turner, in May 1972. Turner's elevation
to the Finance portfolio was seen as a direct attempt by the Prime
Minister to appease the hostile business reaction aroused by his
government's recent policy initiatives. If this was indeed his role,
Turner wasted little time in setting about the task. The immediate
pretext was the introduction by the United States government of a
co-ordinated series of policies in August 1971 designed to promote
greater investment by U.S. multinationals and to encourage them to
relocate some of their manufacturing activity within the boundaries
of the domestic economy. The measures that constituted this part
of President Nixon's new economic policy included a special
investment credit for firms undertaking new investment in the U.S.,
the proposals for an accelerated depreciation range that would
enable firms to derive greater tax benefits from new investment in
the U.S. and the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC)
proposal that was designed to provide for the deferral of corporate
income taxes on profits earned by American corporations from
exports. The DISC proposal gave rise to the greatest concern among
Canadian policy-makers. In the view of an interdepartmental
committee set up to analyze corporate tax incentives, "The D.I.S.C.
legislation posed three potential threats to the Canadian economy -
increased competition from U.S. exporters in Canadian markets,
increased competition in third country markets and increased
incentives for new capital investment and the accompanying new
21J.H. Perry, Background of Current Fiscal Problems, Canadian Tax Paper No. 68
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1982) at 86; the origins of the corporate interest
deduction are discussed in G. Bale, "The Interest Deduction to Acquire Shares in Other
Corporations: An Unfortunate Corporate Welfare Tax Subsidy' (1981) 3 Can. Tax. 189 at
191.
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employment opportunities to be located in the United States rather
than in Canada."22
The Turner budget made it clear that the Canadian
government was not prepared to lose a bidding war with the U.S.
government for the loyalty of American multinationals. The budget
introduced a new two-year write-off of the cost of all machinery and
equipment purchased after 8 May 1972 for use in the manufacturing
and processing of goods in Canada. It also announced a reduction
in the top rate of corporate income tax applicable to manufacturing
and processing profits after 1 January 1973 from 49 to 40 percent.
An independent econometric study of the relative effects of the
Canadian and American tax measures concluded that the degree of
tax relief provided by the Canadian measures was much greater than
that provided by the American ones.23 This substantial difference
can only be explained as an attempt by the Liberal government to
mend some of its fences with the business community and to restore
the terms of the post-war political settlement.
The size of the corporate tax cuts was sufficiently large to
arouse the New Democratic Party to focus on them as a major issue
in the federal election campaign that year. The NDP leader, David
Lewis, travelled across the country denouncing the Liberal
government for its hand-outs to the "corporate welfare bums." Lewis
condemned the Liberals in the following terms:
In the last eight years, the federal government gave away $3.5 billion to industry in
the form of grants and other subsidies, and approximately twice as much in income-
tax concessions - a total of $10 billion to the corporations, most of them large and
wealthy. Despite all this corporate welfare, hundreds of thousands of Canadians are
jobless, and millions are living in poverty. Messrs. Trudeau and Stanfield talk about
the importance of "business confidence". With profits rising every year, I don't
believe we have to cater any longer to this bromide.
2 4
22Canada, Tax Measures Review Committee, Corporate Tax Measures Review (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1975) at 12.
23J. Helliwell & J. Lester, "Reviewing the Latest DISC: Simulations of its Aggregate
Impact on Canada" (1972) 20 Can. Tax. 3. 291 at 297.
2 4 D. Lewis, Louder Voices: The Corporate Welfare Bums (Toronto: James, Lewis and
Samuel, 1972) at 111.
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The attack on the "corporate welfare bums" garnered the NDP a
great deal of attention in the federal election, and the party wound
up holding the balance of power in the next Parliament. The
corporate tax measures had not passed through Parliament before
the election was called, so they had to be reintroduced in the new
session. The NDP eventually agreed to support the passage of the
measures on the condition that their duration would be limited and
that the government adopt an expansionary fiscal stance in the 1973
budget. However, with the return of the Liberals as a majority
government after the federal election of 1974, the corporate tax
incentives were enshrined as permanent features of the tax system.
The corporate tax measures of 1972 were merely the most visible
of a host of changes introduced in the tax system in the years
immediately following tax reform. In each of the five years following
the passage of the tax reform bill, the number of amendments to the
Act ranged between 75 and 175. According to the Minister of
Finance who presided over most of these changes, the extensive
amendments "reflected a decision to roll back on unworkable
sections of "tax reform." It was a deliberate decision."25 The verdict
of what constituted "unworkable" was clearly as much a political
judgment on the effects of tax reform, as it was a technical or
administrative judgment.
The indefinite extension of the corporate tax write-offs in the
fall of 1974 was partially justified as a counter-cyclical stabilization
measure to counter the effects of the global recession brought on
that year by the oPEc 26 energy price increases. As the recession
intensified throughout 1975 and as growing labour militancy squeezed
corporate profits, the government resisted the pressure to implement
mandatory wage and price controls. Instead, it resorted to the
adoption of a 5 percent investment tax credit in the budget of June
1975 for investment in new buildings, machinery and equipment for
the manufacturing and processing industries undertaken between 24
25D.G. Hartle, The Revenue Budget Process of the Government of Canada: Description,
Appraisal, and Proposals, Canadian Tax Paper No. 67 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1982) at 22.
26Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
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June 1975 and 30 June 1977. The tax credit measure was a novel
departure from the previous pattern of corporate tax policy, in that
it resulted in a permanent tax saving rather than the deferred tax
liability which resulted from the accelerated depreciation measures.
The investment tax credit was intended as a direct and permanent
form of relief to the beleaguered business interests suffering from
the increased wage pressure of a militant labour movement.27
The business goodwill so assiduously cultivated by John
Turner in his brief tenure in the Finance portfolio was quickly
dissipated by the introduction of a policy of comprehensive wage and
price controls in the fall of 1975, coupled with Pierre Trudeau's
famous musings on the future of the free enterprise system in a
year-end television interview. Although the business community had
aggressively pressed the government to intervene in restraint of
union wage demands, they were aghast at the kind of complicated
regulations that the newly established Anti-Inflation Board imposed
upon them.
The recession of the mid-1970s, coupled with business's
alienation from the Trudeau government, did little to restore the
Canadian economy to economic growth or lower the historically high
rates of unemployment. The virtual abandonment of Keynesianism
in 1975, with the imposition of wage and price controls and the
swing to monetarism, discredited the post-war settlement from
labour's perspective as well. In an attempt to promote some
semblance of recovery, the government turned again to the tried and
true techniques of the corporate tax incentives. In the budget of
March 1977 the investment tax credit, which had been scheduled to
expire, was extended until 1 July 1980 and its coverage was
expanded to include current and capital expenditures on scientific
research and development. In addition, the credit was increased to
71/2 percent for areas designated under the Regional Development
Incentives Act (RDIA), except for the Gasp6 and the Atlantic
provinces, where it was raised to 10 percent. These measures were
extended further in the budget of April 1978. For the next ten
years corporations would be allowed to deduct from their taxable
27FJ. Harmon & J.A. Johnson, "An Examination of Government Tax Incentives for
Business Investment in Canada" (1978) 26 Can. Tax J. 691 at 694.
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income 50 percent of additional current and capital expenditures on
research and development to the extent that those expenditures
exceeded the average amount spent over the previous three years.28
The second budget of that year, brought down in November,
provided a further extension of the corporate tax incentives. Acting
on the recommendations of the Twenty-three Sector Industry Task
Forces, which had been established as a consultative process with
business and labour to chart a course for industrial strategy, the
Minister of Finance announced the indefinite extension of the
investment tax credit and the raising of the basic rate to 7 percent
from 5 percent. The rate for investments in areas designated under
the RDIA was raised to 10 percent from 7 percent and for those
in the Atlantic provinces and the Gasp6 region of Quebec, it was
doubled from 10 to 20 percent. Furthermore, investments in
equipment for rail, air, water and long-haul road transportation were
also made eligible for the 7 percent basic tax credit.29
The ever greater reliance placed by the government on the
corporate tax system as a policy instrument during the 1970s was the
product of a number of factors. In part it reflected the
government's continuing belief that tax incentives represented an
effective tool to stimulate business investment, despite mounting
academic evidence which cast doubt on this assumption. More
significantly, however, the reliance on corporate tax incentives to
promote economic growth served as a political device to repair the
damage caused by other policy initiatives. In the early 1970s, the
corporate tax incentives were part of a broader effort at fence-
mending to counteract the legacy of the first Trudeau administration.
In the latter part of the decade, the tax incentives clearly constituted
an attempt to placate some of the business community's outrage over
what it saw as the Trudeau government's growing commitment to
state intervention in the economy. The ultimate success of this
attempt to buy business' affections with tax dollars is highly dubious,
28R.M. Bird, Tax Incentives for Investment: 77e State of the Art, Canadian Tax Paper No.
64 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1980) at 6.
2 9 1bid.; the Twenty-three Sector Industry Task Forces are described in greater detail in
R.D. French, How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Indtstrial Policy-Making 1968-1980
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1980) at 120-23.
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given the overwhelming level of support displayed by the business
community for the Progressive Conservative party in the federal
elections of 1979 and 1980.30
The greater reliance on the use of corporate tax incentives
over the course of the decade represented merely the tip of the tax
"iceberg". Reductions in the sales tax, the personal income tax and
tariff rates were added on, along with further improvements in the
terms of Registered Retirement Savings Plans and the introduction
of the Registered Home Ownership Savings Plan. During the
second half of the decade, spending through the tax system is
estimated to have grown at a rate of 42 percent, compared with a
30 percent rate of growth of direct expenditures.31 The federal
budget paper on the deficit, issued in April 1983, estimated that the
net effect of the major discretionary tax changes introduced since
1972 (excluding the indexation of the personal income tax) was to
reduce federal budgetary revenues by $9.825 billion less than they
would otherwise have been in the fiscal year 1982-83.32 The
increased use of tax expenditures as a tool of economic policy over
the course of the decade was a primary cause of the widening
federal budgetary deficit.
The legacy of tax policy in Canada during the 1970s bears a
striking resemblance to the experience of other industrialized
democracies governed by centrist and right-wing parties. The
business and upper-income constituencies of the Liberal party proved
strongly resistant to any attempted imposition of the levels of
taxation necessary to fund the increased social spending of the 1960s.
The Liberal party alienated a substantial portion of its business and
upper-income constituencies during the 1960s with what were
perceived as overly generous transfer programmes, culminating in a
disastrous attempt at comprehensive tax reform. In this context, the
30S. Duncan, "What Ottawa Did to Energy It May Do to Other Industries," The Financial
Post (29 November 1980).
31 E. Tamagno, "Comparing Direct Spending and Tax Spending" (Winter 1979) 1 Can.
Tax. 44.
32 Canada, Department of Finance, The Federal Deficit in Perspective (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1983) at 50-53; D.A. Wolfe, 'qhe Politics of the Deficit" in The Politics of Economic
Policy, supra, note 11 at 120-21.
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tax reform process initiated with the release of the Carter
Commission Report in 1967 stands out as a crucial turning point in
the history of the post-war settlement and the Keynesian welfare
state in Canada. Tax policy had initially constituted an important
policy instrument in the mesh of compromises that bound together
the post-war settlement; as a result of the effort to establish a
rationalized tax system to finance the expanding costs of the welfare
state, it came to symbolize the exact opposite. The price of
repairing the political damage was a steady stream of tax concessions
intended to reassure private enterprises and upper-income individuals
that the cost of the welfare state in Canada would not fall on their
shoulders. The persistent efforts to buy the affections of both large
corporations and upper income earners with tax dollars created
gaping holes in the tax structure and the fiscal position of the
federal government. In many respects, the true legacy of the Carter
Commission was not the reformed Income Tax Act of 1971, but
rather the myriad of tax expenditure items introduced in the
corporate and personal income tax during the decade that followed.
Ultimately, this legacy of tax expenditures, and the burgeoning deficit
they produced, weakened the efficacy of Keynesian fiscal policies and
signalled the demise of the post-war settlement in Canada.
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